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 THREE KEYS TO THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE 
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
RANDY E. BARNETT* 
Establishing the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause requires a 
wealth of evidence. But three key data points are crucial to 
identifying the core of its meaning. First, Supreme Court Justice 
Washington’s explanation of the meaning of “privileges and 
immunities” in Corfield v. Coryell;1 second, the rights protected 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and third, Michigan Senator 
Jacob Howard’s speech explaining the content of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause when introducing the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Senate in 1866. Any theory of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and its original meaning 
that cannot comfortably accommodate these three items is 
highly questionable. 
I. CORFIELD V. CORYELL 
We begin with data point number one. The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, provides, “The 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”2 This clause 
protected the rights of citizens of one state when traveling in 
another state. Although it was generally taken by courts to bar 
discrimination against out-of-staters, antislavery activists 
insisted that it guaranteed to every American citizen the 
                                                                                                                    
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law 
Center; Director, Georgetown Center for the Constitution. This Essay is based on 
remarks delivered at the Federalist Society National Student Symposium at the 
Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, on March 15, 
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cles and a book on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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 1. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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protection of a set of fundamental rights when traveling in an-
another state.3 
For example, the imprisonment of free black sailors from 
Northern states by Southern authorities while in Southern 
ports became a cause célèbre in the North.4 Antislavery 
activists protested this denial of privileges and immunities 
under Article IV, Section 2, despite the Southerners’ assertion 
that they were treating out-of-state blacks in the same manner 
as they treated their own free blacks and hence were not 
discriminating against them.5 For the Northerners, the issue 
was not how a state treated its own citizens, but whether a 
fundamental right of all citizens was being denied to an out-of-
state citizen.6 
What were the fundamental rights to which all citizens were 
entitled under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV? In 1823, Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, 
George Washington’s nephew, was called upon as a Circuit 
Judge to address the scope of the rights protected by Article IV, 
Section 2.7 He began by identifying the “fundamental” 
privileges and immunities protected by the clause. He 
explained: 
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those 
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, 
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose 
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, 
independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental 
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than 
difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all 
comprehended under the following general heads: 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
                                                                                                                    
 3. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 
104–07 (2011). 
 4. See, e.g., David R. Upham, The Meanings of the “Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizen” on the Eve of the Civil War, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1133 (2016); see 
also, e.g., Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen 
Acts, 1822–1848, 1 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 3, 21 (1935) (“The enforcement of the Negro 
seaman acts was a grievance against which northerners . . . protested.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 5. See Upham, supra note 4, at 1141–48. 
 6. See Hamburger, supra note 3, at 105.  
 7. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
No. 1] Three Keys to Privileges or Immunities 3 
 
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to 
pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to 
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for 
the general good of the whole.8 
For Justice Washington, “privileges and immunities” are 
rights that (1) “are, in their nature, fundamental”; (2) “belong, 
of right, to the citizens of all free governments”; and (3) can be 
found in the positive law in the states, which included common 
law rights.9 Justice Washington then proceeded to list some 
examples, such as the rights to travel, to claim the writ of 
habeas corpus, to maintain lawsuits, and others.10 
In the highlighted passage of Justice Washington’s 
description of these privileges and immunities, he included 
nearly verbatim the canonical formulation of natural rights 
penned by George Mason for the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, which was replicated in four state constitutions. In his 
May 27, 1776, committee draft, Mason wrote: 
T[hat] all men are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, 
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; among 
which are, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of ac-
quiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety.11 
Mason’s description of “natural rights” are the same words 
used by Justice Washington in Corfield.12 
It was upon similar language in Article I of the Massachu-
setts Constitution that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts based its 1783 ruling that slavery was unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                    
 8. Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. at 551. 
 10. Id. at 552. 
 11. George Mason, Committee Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights and 
edited by the Virginia Convention (May 27, 1776) (emphasis added),  
https://consource.org/document/committee-draft-of-the-virginia-declaration-of-
rights-and-edited-by-the-virginia-convention-1776-5-27/20130122081535/ [https://
perma.cc/4E74-LZH2]. I discuss the evolution of Mason’s draft and its influence 
on the Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson just a couple 
weeks later, and on the constitutions of other states in RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR 
REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE 32–40, 66–69 (2016). 
 12. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52. 
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in that state:13 “All men are born free and equal, and have cer-
tain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which 
may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their 
lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and 
happiness.”14 
If, therefore, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment provided federal protection to the same set 
of fundamental rights to which the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV refers, then these privileges or immunities 
include, inter alia, the natural right to “the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the [natural] right to acquire and possess 
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness 
and safety.”15 
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 
Data point number two: On April 9, 1866, Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, officially styled as an act “to pro-
tect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and 
furnish the Means of their Vindication.”16 Commonly known as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the act was passed pursuant to 
Congress’s enumerated power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude.17 It began by de-
claring “That all persons born in the United States and not sub-
ject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are 
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States . . . .”18 It 
then proceeded to guarantee that all such persons: 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the 
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
                                                                                                                    
 13. The case itself is preserved in the archival materials of various Massachu-
setts figures. For a description of this case and its historical record, see generally 
John D. Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: 
More Notes on the “Quock Walker Case,” 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1961). 
 14. MASS. CONST., art. I., annulled by MASS. CONST., art. CVI. 
 15. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52. 
 16. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012)). 
 17. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (“Congress, as we have seen, by 
the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, passed in view of the Thirteenth Amendment, before 
the Fourteenth was adopted undertook to wipe out these burdens and disabilities, 
the necessary incidents of slavery . . . .”). 
 18. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1. 
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and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey 
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and proper-
ty, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contra-
ry notwithstanding.19 
After its passage, President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill 
as beyond the power of Congress to enact under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.20 
Congress responded by overriding the veto with a superma-
jority vote,21 but some members were concerned about whether 
such a measure really was within congressional power.22 Oth-
ers had a different concern. What would happen to this statuto-
ry guarantee once the Democrats from the Southern states re-
sumed their seats in Congress? Democrats were loudly 
proclaiming that it was their intent to repeal the bill as soon as 
they got the chance.23 Who could say if they might one day 
have the votes to do so? In addition, what would the courts say 
about Congress trying to reverse, by a mere statute, the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford24 denying the 
descendants of African slaves could ever be citizens of the 
United States?25 
For all of these reasons, many in Congress supported a paral-
lel effort to adopt a constitutional amendment to make the 
freedmen United States citizens and to protect the fundamental 
rights of all United States citizens from being abridged by state 
                                                                                                                    
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
 20. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679–81 (1866) (veto message of Presi-
dent Johnson). 
 21. Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 10 (2012). 
 22. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 80 (1986) (describing how Repre-
sentative John Bingham argued that Congress lacked the power to pass the 1866 
Civil Rights Act before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also 
Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 361 
n.131 (2006). 
 23. Barnett, supra note 21, at 10–11. 
 24. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 25. Id. at 404 (“We think [African slaves] are not, and that they are not included, 
and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitu-
tion, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instru-
ment provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”). 
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governments, as Southern states were commonly violating the 
rights of both freed blacks and white Republicans.26 Which 
fundamental rights were protected? At least the rights listed in 
the Civil Rights Act, including the rights “to make and enforce 
contracts, . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey 
real and personal property”27—rights that correspond to the 
description of natural rights by Justice Washington in Corfield.  
If it was the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment that protected these rights, then these 
rights are among “the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States.”28 
III. SENATOR JACOB HOWARD’S SPEECH TO SENATE 
This leads us to data point number three: Senator Jacob 
Howard’s speech to the Senate explaining the meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause during the debate over the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Six weeks after passing the Civil 
Rights Act, on May 23, 1866, Michigan Senator Jacob Howard 
introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate as its des-
ignated sponsor.29 On that day, he delivered a comprehensive 
and widely reported address in which he explained the mean-
ing of the amendment. 
Howard began with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
which he described as “very important.”30 By this clause, he 
said, citizens of the United States “are, by constitutional right, 
entitled to these privileges and immunities, and may assert this 
right and these privileges and immunities, and ask for their 
                                                                                                                    
 26. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Critical Guide to Using the Legislative History of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to Determine the Amendment’s Original Meaning, 49 CONN. L. 
REV. 1069, 1084 (2017) (“[A]fter the Civil War, the Southern States were systemati-
cally denying civil rights to former slaves.”); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The 
Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 
95, 99–100 (2016) (discussing post-Civil War violence against and murders of Tex-
an blacks and white Republicans that went largely unpunished). 
 27. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 (2012)). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 29. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–67 (1866) (statement of Sen. How-
ard). For a discussion of the significance of Howard’s speech, see Randy E. Barnett 
& Evan D. Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A Critique of Kurt 
Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 499–503 (2020). 
 30. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
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enforcement whenever they go within the limits of the several 
States of the Union.”31 In other words, no state shall abridge the 
fundamental rights of a citizen of the United States. The ques-
tion then becomes: What are these fundamental rights? 
According to Howard, the privileges or immunities—or in 
his words the “fundamental guarantees”32—of United States 
citizenship can be found in two textual sources in the Constitu-
tion. The first source was “the privileges and immunities spo-
ken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitu-
tion,”33 that is, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV. Howard noted that he was “not aware that the Supreme 
Court have ever undertaken to define either the nature or ex-
tent of the privileges and immunities thus guarantied.”34 Nev-
ertheless, he said, “we may gather some intimation of what 
probably will be the opinion of the judiciary by referring to a 
case adjudged many years ago in one of the circuit courts of the 
United States by Judge Washington”35—referring to our first 
data point: Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell. 
Howard then read “what that very learned and excellent 
judge says about these privileges and immunities of the citi-
zens of each State in the several States”36 including the lan-
guage I highlighted above: “protection by the Government, the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happi-
ness and safety.”37 In his handwritten notes for his senate 
speech, Howard described all of these Corfield privileges and 
immunities as “these fundamental civil rights of citizens”38 
                                                                                                                    
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 2766. 
 33. Id. at 2765. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 
3,230)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38. Handwritten Notes, Jacob Howard, Senator, U.S. Senate, Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 3 (1866) [hereinafter Handwritten 
Notes] (emphasis on second word added), http://www.tifis.org/sources/
Howard.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6HA-X2YK]. On page “2” of his notes, Howard 
discussed Corfield. On page “3,” which presumably originally followed immedi-
ately after page “2,” he described them as “these fundamental civil rights of citi-
zens, whatever may be their nature or extent.” At some point in advance of his 
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which connects this passage of his speech to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. But Howard was not yet finished. 
He then located a second source of fundamental rights: “To 
these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for 
they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent 
and precise nature—to these should be added the personal 
rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of 
the Constitution . . . .”39 After reading a list that included most 
of the rights listed in these amendments, Howard then summa-
rized his understanding of these two textual sources of privi-
leges or immunities.40 “Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, 
immunities, and rights, some of them secured by the second 
section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which I have 
recited, some by the first eight amendments of the Constitu-
tion . . . .”41 
It is important that Howard did not indicate that these were 
two distinct categories of rights to be protected in different 
ways. For example, he did not privilege the enumerated rights 
in the first eight amendments at the expense of the Corfield 
rights. Rather, he described them all as “a mass of privileges, 
immunities, and rights” to which the text of the Constitution 
already refers.42 In addition, although he relied on the text of 
the Constitution for authority, he did not rely solely on the 
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights. The funda-
mental rights to which the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV refers are not themselves “enumerated” in the text. 
Howard then explained that a constitutional amendment 
was necessary to protect all these rights because, at present, 
“[t]hey do not operate in the slightest degree as a restraint or 
prohibition upon State legislation.”43 So “[t]he great object of 
the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the 
                                                                                                                    
speech, Howard inserted pages “2a” and “2b”—after page 2 and before page 3—
which referred to the rights in the first eight amendments.  
 39. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Howard apparently added 
his reference to the rights in the first eight amendments as pages “2a” and “2b” of 
his notes. See Howard, Handwritten Notes, supra note 38. 
 40. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. 
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power of the States and compel them at all times to respect 
these great fundamental guarantees.”44 
In a speech delivered three years later, Howard offered this 
summary of the Privileges or Immunities Clause: 
The occasion of introducing the first section of the four-
teenth article of amendment into that amendment grew out 
of the fact that there was nothing in the whole Constitution 
to secure absolutely the citizens of the United States in the var-
ious States against an infringement of their rights and privileg-
es under the second section of the fourth article of the old Constitu-
tion. That section declares that—“The citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the several States.”45 
On this occasion, Howard did not feel the need to make spe-
cial reference to the first eight amendments presumably be-
cause, along with Corfield rights, these too were among the 
privileges and immunities of United States citizens to which, 
he believed, Article IV, Section 2 referred. Chief Justice Taney 
had made the same assumption in Dred Scott when he wrote 
that Southern states would never have agreed that free blacks 
could be citizens of the United States, because that would entail 
that Article IV, Section 2 “would give them the full liberty of 
speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its 
own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon politi-
cal affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”46 
CONCLUSION 
We can summarize the original meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause that is derived from these three key data 
points in a single run on sentence:  
 
 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
(1) those privileges and immunities (a) which are, in their 
nature, fundamental; (b) which belong, of right, to the citi-
                                                                                                                    
 44. Id. at 2766. 
 45. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1003 (1869) (emphases added) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1). 
 46. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857). 
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zens of all free governments; and (c) which have, at all times, 
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which 
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, 
independent, and sovereign,  
(2) such as the protection by the government, the enjoyment 
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess 
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness 
and safety, and  
(3) the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey 
real and personal property as well as  
(4) the personal guarantees contained in the first eight 
amendments. 
The idea that Congress and the federal courts can protect this 
“mass of privileges, immunities, and rights”47 from abridgment 
by state governments may seem like a radical proposition. And 
there is no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment did alter the 
nature of our federalism by design. But it is not nearly as radi-
cal as it sounds. 
Recall that Justice Washington added that “the enjoyment of 
life and liberty” and “the right to acquire and possess property 
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety” 
was “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government 
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”48 In 
other words, states have the just power to regulate the exercise 
of these rights—which is called the police power—provided 
that such regulations are actually adopted to serve an end to 
which legislators are competent—such as the protection of the 
health and safety of the public. 
As Justice Bradley explained in his dissenting opinion in the 
Slaughter-House Cases,49 “The right of a State to regulate the 
conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and exten-
sive one, and not to be lightly restricted,”50 but still, “there are 
certain fundamental rights which this right of regulation can-
not infringe.”51 He then made the following distinction: “It may 
                                                                                                                    
 47. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
 48. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 49. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 50. Id. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. 
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prescribe the manner of their exercise, but it cannot subvert the 
rights themselves.”52 Prescribing “the manner of their exercise” 
is regulation; subversion is violation and abridgment. 
Under this approach, identifying the rights, privileges, or 
immunities of citizens is of less significance than identifying 
the proper basis for regulating them and ensuring a fit between 
a proper end and the means adopted to achieve it. After the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this was accom-
plished by the development of a theory of the police power of 
states.53 Evan Bernick and I discuss this theory elsewhere in 
great detail.54 But the bottom line of our analysis is that regula-
tions are proper if they rationally relate to an end within the 
competence of state legislatures. 
Astute readers will recognize this test as “rational basis scru-
tiny,” and it is what rationality review was until the New Deal 
Court. As the Court said in United States v. Carolene Products:55 
no pronouncement of a legislature can forestall attack upon 
the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by 
applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, and that 
a statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in 
judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to 
show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or 
property had a rational basis.56 
This type of rationality review is not the conceivable basis 
scrutiny that was adopted by the Warren Court in Williamson v. 
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,57 which only requires judges to im-
agine why a legislature “might” have restricted liberty.58  
                                                                                                                    
 52. Id. 
 53. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist 
Theory of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019). 
 54. See id. 
 55. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 56. Id. at 144 (emphases added); see also id. at 153 (“Where the existence of a 
rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts 
beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject 
of judicial inquiry, and the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the exis-
tence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that 
those facts have ceased to exist.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
 57. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 487 (“The legislature might have concluded that the frequency 
of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regula-
tion of the fitting of eyeglasses.”); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 
307, 309 (1993) (“The question before us is whether there is any conceivable ra-
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Rather the traditional rationality review articulated by the 
Court in Carolene Products was the approach employed by the 
three-judge lower court panel in Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. v. 
Williamson,59 which the Supreme Court reversed.60  
The careful analysis conducted by that panel demonstrated 
that, if there is the will to restore the original meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause’s protection of fundamental 
rights, there is also a feasible way. 
                                                                                                                    
tional basis justifying this distinction for purposes of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 59. 120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954), rev’d, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 60. Id; see Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the 
Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012). 
